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1. HERewith FULL TEXT TAD SZULC OP-ED COLUMN IN WASHPOST,
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 12, HEADLINED "THE CHOU EN-LAI ANALYSIS".

2. PEKING'S PERCEPTION OF A LONG-RANGE SOVIET STRATEGIC
THREAT IS SHIFTING AWAY FROM THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER TO
SOUTH ASIA AND, EVEN BEYOND IT, TO THE PERSIAN GULF AREA.
CHINA, THEREFORE, IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED WITH THE GROW-
ING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN AND THE
SECURITY OF PAKISTAN AND IRAN. HER VIEW--APPARENTLY
SHARED TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE BY SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT
POLICY THINKERS--IS THAT THE HUGE ASIAN LAND MASS STRETCH-
ING FROM THE EASTERN HIMALAYAN RANGES TO THE PERSIAN GULF
REPRESENTS A DANGEROUSLY UNSTABLE STRATEGIC REGION.

3. THIS IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGING WORLD STRATEGIC
SITUATION WAS PRESENTED BY PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI TO PAKI-
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STAND PRIME MINISTER ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO AND HIS MINISTER

OF STATE FOR DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AZIZ AHMED, WHEN THEY VISITED PEKING BETWEEN MAY 11 AND 15. DIPLOMATS HERE, FAMILIAR WITH THESE CONVERSATIONS, SAY THAT AZIZ AHMED CONVEYED THE ESSENCE OF CHOU'S OPINIONS TO PRESIDENT NIXON AT AN UNPUBLICIZED WHITE HOUSE MEETING ON MAY 23. THE MINISTER SUBSEQUENTLY RETURNED TO WASHINGTON FOR

SEPARATE CONFERENCES WITH SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER AND DEFENSE SECRETARY JAMES SCHLESINGER IN EARLY JUNE.

4. THE ASSUMPTION HERE IS THAT CHOU WAS ACTIVELY INTERESTED IN HAVING THE PAKISTANIS DISCREETLY RELAY HIS THOUGHTS TO NIXON AS THE PRESIDENT PREPARED FOR HIS FORTHCOMING JOURNEY TO MOSCOW TO MEET CHAIRMAN LEONID BREZHNEV LATER THIS MONTH. IT IS UNKNOWN WHETHER THE CHINESE HAVE COMMUNICATED SIMILAR IDEAS TO DAVID BRUCE, THE HEAD OF THE AMERICAN "LIAISON MISSION" IN PEKING, OR WHETHER TENG HSIAO PING, THE CHINESE DEPUTY PREMIER, DID SO WHEN HE CONFERED WITH KISSINGER IN NEW YORK EARLIER THIS SPRING DURING THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. BUT THE CHINESE ARE KNOWN TO HAVE A PREDILECTION FOR CONTACTS ON THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL, AND IT IS RELEVANT IN THE CONTEXT THAT PAKISTAN WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN ARRANGING KISSINGER'S SECRET PEKING TRIP IN 1971.

5. IT IS ALSO TO THE POINT THAT CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTED PAKISTAN IN THE DECEMBER 1971 WAR WITH INDIA OVER BANGLADESH, WHILE THE INDIANS ENJOYED SOVIET SUPPORT. THE UNITED STATES HAS A VIRTUAL ALLIANCE WITH IRAN, A COUNTRY WITH WHICH THE CHINESE LIKEWISE HAVE WARM RELATIONS. IN THIS SENSE, THEN, WASHINGTON AND PEKING HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING FOR SOME TIME NOW A COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA AND THE GULF AREA.

6. AS UNDERSTOOD BY DIPLOMATS HERE, CHOU INDICATED TO THE PAKISTANIS THAT CHINA IS LESS CONCERNED NOWADAYS OVER A DIRECT SOVIET ATTACK, NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL, THAN SHE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME YEARS AGO. CHOU, IT IS SAID, BELIEVES THAT THE PRESENCE OF ONE MILLION OR SO SOVIET TROOPS ON UNCLASSIFIED

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THE CHINESE BORDER DOES NOT APPEAR TO CONSTITUTE AN IMMIDENT THREAT; IT WOULD BE A DIFFERENT MATTER, IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE RUSSIANS MASSED THREE MILLION MEN THERE. NEVERTHELESS, CHOU SUGGESTED, CHINA IS NOT TAKING ANY CHANCES AND MAINTAINS STRICT VIGILANCE ALONG ITS FRONTIER.

7. THE SHIFTING CHINESE PERCEPTION OF SOVIET MOVES IS THAT MOSCOW HAS NOW SET ITS COURSE FIRMLY ON A POLITICAL

STRATEGY IN SOUTH ASIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF, BOTH TO OUT-FLANK CHINA FROM THE SOUTH AND TO ESTABLISH ITS PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE CONCLUSIVELY ON THE EASTERN APPROACHES TO THE PERSIAN GULF. SIMPLIFIED AND PARAPHRASED, THIS IS HOW CHOU IS SAID TO REGARD THE SITUATION:

- BREZHNEV'S LONG-STANDING PROPOSAL FOR AN ASIAN SECURITY PACT IS DESIGNED TO EXTEND THE SOVIET INFLUENCE TO THE

INDIAN OCEAN. THE FIRST STEPS WERE THE FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH INDIA IN 1971, AND THE APPEARANCE OF THE SOVIET FLEET IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND AT THE SOUTHERN ENTRANCE TO THE RED SEA WHERE BASES ARE AVAILABLE TO IT IN SOMALIA AND ADEN.

- PAKISTAN IS CONSIDERED BY THE RUSSIANS AS A MAJOR OBSTACLE IN THIS STRATEGIC CONCEPT. ALTHOUGH MOSCOW INCESSANTLY URGES PAKISTAN TO LOOK WITH SYMPATHY ON THE PROPOSED ASIAN PACT, IT WOULD NOT BE DISPLEASED TO SEE PAKISTAN FURTHER DISMEMBERED, FOLLOWING ITS LOSS OF EAST PAKISTAN.

- THIS POLICY WAS REFLECTED IN LAST YEAR'S COUP D'ETAT IN AFGHANISTAN, WHERE A PRONOUNCEDLY PRO-SOVIET REGIME IS NOW IN POWER. THIS OUTFLANKS PAKISTAN IN THE NORTHWEST, AND THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE QUIETLY ENCOURAGING "AUTONOMOUS" PUSHTU TRIBES IN AREAS CONTIGUOUS TO AFGHANISTAN.

- BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE RUSSIANS ARE TAKING CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN AGITATION FOR THE CREATION OF A "GREATER BALUCHISTAN" FROM PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN BALUCHIS.

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- THE RUSSIANS SEEM TO HAVE ACCEPTED, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, THEIR LOSS OF INFLUENCE IN EGYPT AND POSSIBLY SYRIA. INSTEAD, THEY ARE CONCENTRATING ON IRAQ (ON HOSTILE TERMS WITH IRAN AND KUWAIT), AFGHANISTAN AND INDIA. THERE MAY BE SOVIET BACKING FOR THE DHOFAR REBELLION IN OMAN, A PERSIAN GULF LITTORAL STATE. THE IRAQIS, IN TURN, BACK THE BALUCHISTAN MOVEMENT.

8. FROM ALL THE FOREGOING, PREMIER CHOU HAS REPORTEDLY CONCLUDED THAT THE MAJOR THRUST OF THE NEW SOVIET POLICY IS DIRECTED AT THIS VAST REGION, POSING A THREAT TO CHINA AS WELL AS PAKISTAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF.

9. CHINA, THEREFORE, WOULD WELCOME A MORE ENERGETIC UNITED STATES POSTURE IN ITS DEALING WITH BREZHNEV OVER THIS WHOLE AREA. SHE IS PLEASED WITH WASHINGTON'S MILI-

TARY COOPERATION WITH IRAN AND, PRESUMABLY, WOULD LOOK KINDLY UPON THE LIFTING OF THE AMERICAN ARMS' EMBARGO AGAINST PAKISTAN. ON THIS POINT, HOWEVER, THE PAKISTANIS HAVE MADE NO PROGRESS DESPITE THE MOST RECENT DISCUSSIONS AHMED AZIZ HAS CONDUCTED WITH NIXON, KISSINGER AND SCHLESINGER. PAKISTANIS THINK THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT FOR INDIA RENDERS MEANINGLESS THE 1965 AMERICAN EMBARGO IN SOUTH ASIA.

10. CHINA'S ANNOYANCE WITH INDIA, EVEN ANTEDATING LAST MONTH'S INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION, WAS ILLUSTRATED BY PREMIER CHOU'S REFUSAL EVEN TO ANSWER A RECENT PRIVATE LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GHANDI, WHICH PROPOSED THE NORMALIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. CHOU TAKES THE VIEW THAT INDIA MUST FIRST NORMALIZE HER RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN.

11. A FINAL NOTE ABOUT THE PAKISTANI IMPRESSIONS GATHERED IN PEKING LAST MONTH: THERE IS NOTHING TO CORROBORATE THE REPORTS THAT PREMIER CHOU IS BEING POLITICALLY ECLIPSED BY HIS DEPUTY, TENG HSIAO PING. ALTHOUGH HIS HEALTH IS FRAIL AND HE MISSED SOME SOCIAL EVENTS DURING THE BHUTTO VISIT, CHOU PERSONALLY CONDUCTED ALL THE WORKING SESSIONS WITH THE PAKISTANIS, AND HIS POLITICAL STANDING SEEMED BEYOND DISPUTE. AND THE PAKISTANIS COULD DETECT NO VEERING AWAY FROM THE CHINESE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. SISCO
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